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Poor Countries' Dwindling External Options; "Bargaining"; and the
Case for Multiple Bilateralism
Michael Lipton*
This paper attempts to offer tentative guidelines in two areas:
analytic and advisory. It examines some of the factors influencing
the range of choices in dealings between rich and poor countries in
the post-oil-crisis world; and it suggests, to negotiators for
less-developed countries insofar as they are seeking ways to make
poor people less poor, how the outcomes of such dealings might
better assist in that search.
Bergsten2 has perceptively analysed some of the reasons why the
assumptions regarding international economic co-operation, more or
less valid in 1945-70, have become highly dubious. These
assumptions, although they certainly cloaked a great deal of
dominance by the rich and the strong, nevertheless underlay a system
in which poor countries were able to make some unprece4ented
economic advances. Superimposed on the post-1971 problems of
monetary instability, neo-protectionism and economic multipolarity
comes the oil crisis. For the next three years (19 74-76) at least, this
threatens a sharp reversal of progress in poor countries (most of
which have been net importers of oil at rapidly increasing rates), and
renders them even less able to afford the high opportunity-cost of
bad negotiating styles and procedures than was the case before.
* Michael Lipton is a Fellow of the Institute.
This is a revised and shortened version of a paper given by the author at the
Oxford Conference of the International Political Economy Group in January
19 74. It is emphasised that in exploring the case for bilateralism as a more
promising framework than an ailing multilateralism for the achievement of
balanced and lasting trade expansion between poor and rich countries, the
paper in no way seeks to justify the rash of bilateral deals between developed
and oil producing countries in the wake of the crisis.
2 C.F. Bergsten, The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda
for Research, Heath, 1973.
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The breakdown of traditional assumptions about rich-poor relations
Since Bergsten wrote, in the aftermath of the events of late 1971,
that "the monetary and trading systems which governed
international economic relations (in 1945-70) have collapsed", any
residual "systems" that might be reconstructed from the wreckage
have themselves been heavily battered. The oil price increase was
much larger than might have been expected, and this has been
superimposed on substantial increases in the prices of other raw
materials. In the medium term (say the next five years), Western
economies will substantially restore their output and
balance-of-payments positions, by means of a less energy-intensive
output-mix, a switch to new oil sources, and a replacement of oil by
other sources of energy. My own hunch is that this "medium term"
will begin sooner rather than later - say by 19 76-77 (less soon,
though, than the journalists' rash of discovered sources of instant
innovation, which look too much like an effort to scare oil prices
back down!). If there is a substantial chance that this hunch is right,
however, it intensifies the likelihood that the oil-producing countries
will exploit to the full the short-run advantage, subject only to the
constraint of avoiding the perceived risk of unacceptable retaliation.
The breakdown of internal consensus in both the USA and UK, the
policy splits in EEC, the absence (so far) of effective joint consumer
action on energy - all these contemporary phenomena, political
counterparts of what in economics are low short-run elasticities (of
demand and substitution), intensify the case for swift exploitation
by the oil-producing countries of their market advantage. Until 1976
at least, Japan, most of Western Europe and Australasia face (a)
substantial balance-of-payments deficits, (b) at best, serious
retardation of growth, involving (through the principle of
acceleration), (c) reduction in output of, and demand by,
investment-goods industries. Almost certainly (b) is too optimistic
for 1974 and probably 1975 and income-per-person will fall in those
years. There is of course a trade-off: the greater the reduction in
output any Western country or bloc is willing to accept, the less oil it
needs and hence (if the output would have been consumed
domestically) the less its balance-of-payments deficit. Hence there is
a serious risk, not just of competitive devaluation and other more or
less selfish measures to export unemployment, but also that rich
countries already in bad balance-of-payments positions - notably
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Britain - will feel compelled to prevent further deterioration by
savage internal demand deflation, transmitting their deficits to
Western trading partners already paying higher prices for oil, and
forcing them to deflate also.
This faces poor countries with at least three probable forms of
damage, corresponding to the accelerated collapse of three principles
of international dealing more basic than those listed by Bergsten.
(a) From bipolar to tripolar capital flows: first, the capacity to
support large-scale foreign investment in poor countries - whether
publicly through aid, or privately; whether out of current-account
balance-of-payments surpluses, or through the tolerable enlargement
of manageable deficits - is being transferred from Western Europe,
North America and Australasia to the Middle East; from nations
prepared to transfer financial resources to poor countries, to nations
not yet so prepared. This is superimposed upon an already existing
trend. Real net aid transfers per head of recipient population, and
the proportion of donor GNP given as grant.equivalent gross aid - the
nearest measures of aid benefit and burden respectively - have been
declining sinëe the mid-1960 s3 So called "net" private foreign
investment in poor countries is by no means "net" of repatriated
dividends and profits: on the latter account both India4 and Latin
America5 were big "donors" to the rich world in the 1960's, though
there was a substantial positive flow to mineral-producing countries
in Africa, and to the oil-producing countries themselves.6
This last flow, being to states stuffed with finance to the point of
nausea, is paradoxical to those who see private foreign investment as
an aid-surrogate, by which "mature creditor-lender" nations at once
enrich themselves and advance development by turning finance
capital into physical capital in poor countries. To realists, however, it
merely emphasises the move to a tripolar world economy. Between
1974 and 1976 at least most rich and poor countries alike will be in
chronic deficit; the only big surpluses will be in the oil-producing
countries.
ECD/DAC, Development Co-operation, Annual Report 1973.
M. Kidron, Foreign Aid in India, Oxford 1966.
K. Griffin, Economic Development in Spanish America, 1970.
6 UNCTAD Handbook 1972, pp. 222-3.
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The bipolar, rich-to-poor capital-flow system of the early 19 60's
must be replaced by a tripolar system: investment flows from oil
producers to poor countries, development imports by poor countries
from rich countries; oil purchases by rich countries from oil
producers.
It matters less whether the flow from oil producers to poor countries
is to (or from) public or private sectors. Some will be "aid" but most
will be fairly hard and must thus support fairly high-yield
investments in developing countries. Rich countries can help (a) by
insurance and guarantee facilities (making use of the natural
tendency for surplus funds to find their way into Western financial
institutions), (b) by interest rate subsidies (c) by pre-investment
surveys.
If oil-producing nations instead immobilise their burgeoning reserves
- or, worse, switch them around, or in and out of, key-currency
countries - the deflationary results, for rich and poor countries
alike, could be terrifying, with multiplier-accelerator consequences
(and effects on confidence) long outlasting the initial impact of the
oil price increase. The present fixation of OPEC countries on very
short-run holdings in London does nothing to help poor countries
buy oil - and is a constant threat to Britain (the Kreditanstalt of the
1974 crash?) Thus "tripolarisation" of capital flows is a major,
urgent task.
(b) Threatened Trade Contraction: it is not only aid and private-
capital flows that rich countries will be tempted to reduce as growth
decelerates and balance-of-payments deficits burgeon. Imports from
poor countries are also likely to be under pressure to contract, unless
steps towards balanced bilateral expansion (concentrating especially
on two-way trade in non-oil-intensive items) are taken. Rising
unemployment and scarce foreign exchange will most certainly not
render Western countries prone to one-way liberalisations.
Two sources of hope, alas, appear illusory. It might be thought that
the West would welcome imports of such items as jute and cotton
textile manufactures from India and Bangladesh, since they replace
oil-intensive synthetic fibres; but presumably it is no less oil-saving,
and more employment-creating, to simply buy the raw materials and
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put up protective barriers against finished products. Second, it might
be imagined that the "commodity boom" has given poor countries in
general plenty of foreign exchange;1 but in fact the gains from the
price increases of other commodities are distributed very unevenly
through the Third World. A recent UNCTAD Study8 has shown that
even in 1973 (prior to the oil crisis) 31 countries containing more
than 50% of the Third World population suffered deteriorating
external payments situations as a consequence of the boom. Given
the oil price increase even the most optimistic assumptions about the
future of commodity prices (that they will remain at the highest
levels reached) result in a forecast in 1974 of 39 countries with 65%
of the population facing adverse terms of trade. In any case the
boom is extremely vulnerable to an oil-induced recession, and in
addition it should be borne in mind that those countries which have
benefited have shared those benefits with companies based in rich
countries.
Like the contraction of capital flow to poor countries, the "oil."
threat to trade confirms established trends. Poor countries' export
prospects to rich countries have long been retarded by the
substitution of waffling goodwill about "concessions" and of hope
that comparative advantage and the general benefit would somehow
prevail, for serious analysis of the economic interests involved. This
has been compounded by (a) the misinterpretation of manufactured-
export data so aggregated as to attribute the benefits of expansion of
one or two not-so-poor countries (Hongkong, Israel, Taiwan) to "less
developed countries" as a whole, (b) the neglect of real problems
about sluggish export volumes in favour of a fruitless and anti-
theoretical search for long-run trends in export prices, (c) false
dichotomisation into "rich countries won't buy" and "poor
countries don't supply", when the reality is that whichever
constraint happens to limit export growth in a particular case,
nobody will expect tempting profits from its removal if the other
constraint swiftly replaces it.
'7 A. Hone, "The Commodities Boom", New Left Review, 81,1973; M. Westlake,
Times Business News, 27 November 1973.
8 The impact of recent and prospective price changes on the trade of developing
countries. UNCTAD/OSG/5 2, April 1974.
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The sluggish expansion of manufactured exports (and the poor
outlook for many commodity exports) from most poor countries to
most rich countries has been worsened by other recent developments
the entry of Britain to EEC, in its impact on Indian textile
exports, being an outstanding case. Unlike the capital-flow problem,
the trade threat, insofar as it is worsened by the oil crisis, cannot be
much helped by "tripolarisation", since the oil-producing countries'
markets for poor countries' exports are usually very small, and the
rare exceptions (e.g. tea) are mostly in income-inelastic demand.
Given the West's likely balances of payments to 976, balanced
expansion of its sales to, and purchases from, poor countries are a
much better hope than one-way expansion of market access for
them. Political joint action will be needed to realise the potential
joint economic advantages of such balanced expansion. Especially
during the next few years, with probable contractionist pressures,
freer trade is too important to be left to the free-traders.
(c) Possible Breakdown of Contracts: contracts arise partly from
past power relations, past levels of economic endurance, past
information and misinformation, and much else. Unlike the "trade"
and "capital" threats to rich-poor relations, the "contract" threat is a
reversal of recent trends. Defaults on international debt have been
much rarer features of rich-poor relations since 1945 than before
1914 or in 19 19-39. Deliberate breaches of contract by governments
e.g. uncompensated nationalisation despite guarantees, or
expulsion or banning of racial groups despite legal commitments
have also been fairly uncommon.
In the aftermath of the oil crisis, voluntary and involuntary breaches
of international economic contract seem likely to become much
more frequent. The success of some oil-producing countries in
denouncing and abandoning, without effective response,
arrangements on prices, royalties and ownership recently and freely
entered into has been little notices. While few if any commodities
possess the special features of oil, it must be expected that other
producers will try the same trick, if market conditions make it
possible.
Another major area where voluntary breach of contract by poor
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countries is increasingly likely concerns treatment of foreign capital.
Consider for example India, whose behaviour towards foreign-owned
firms has been, by Western capitalist standards, exemplary.
Remissions have greatly exceeded new inflows, yet India has neither
restricted profit outflows nor confiscated assets. That has been partly
because her leaders believe in sanctity of contract; partly because
they see advantages in the presence of private foreign capital; but
largely because other advantages to India - aid, market access have
appeared to be associated with reasonable tolerance of such capital.
The impact of the oil crisis seems bound to imperil those associated
advantages. The conventional negotiating categories and methods of
"concessions" will bear little weight if Western income-levels and
foreign balances dramatically worsen, and India is likely to lose both
aid and market-access. Since she anyway will be driven by the rising
price of oil to tighten an already desperately small belt (and since the
outflow of remissions will thus become increasingly unacceptable)
the political appeal of confiscation must increase substantially. And
this in India, where foreign capital is under 8% of total capital,9 and
where the government's "socialism" is pretty Fabian. What of other
poor countries?
Trade Liberalisation, bargaining, and the case for bilateralism
Balance-of-payments constraints, subsequent to the "oil crises",
render rich countries even less likely than in the past to make trade
access for poor countries easier unilaterally. Why so? After all, even
one-way trade liberalisation is not a concession but - if it is worth
doing - something that brings gains to both trading partners. In
practice, however, producer pressure groups have impeded market
access for exports from LDCs, while LDCs have been unwilling to
offer reciprocal freeing of trade to rich countries, relying instead on a
moral case for unilateral easing of access, presented as a quest for
concessions.
The moral case for helping poor countries has great force, which
should be used where possible to goad rich-country elites into action.
M. Lipton and J. Firn, The Erosion of a Relationship: India and Britain since
1960, OUP/RIIA, 1974.
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However, the undue reliance of the "development lobby" on the
moral case (a) has led to the neglect of common rich poor interests in
trade and aid expansion; (b) has deceived poor coUntries into relying
on rich governments' willingness to defy pressure-groups and
generously to implement vague and permissive international
legislation (e.g. the UNCTAD's "generalised scheme of preferences",
or Article 24, paragraph 8, non-reciprocity, of the GATT); (c) would
be particularly misplaced and counter-productive under the unhappy
circumstances of 19 74-76. As unemployment and payments deficits
in the West, and perhaps voluntary and involuntary contract-breaking
in the South, gather momentum, those terrible parrot-cries of
"charity begins at home" and "why help those who damage us?"
may well drown out the moral judgements of articulate minorities. If
dear oil renders rich countries more reluctant to accept temporary
balance-of-payments costs - from aid or unilaterally free trade - the
possible common gains, from bilaterally expanded rich-poor
dealings, need to be much more fully explored.
Involuntary contract-breaking, too, seems certain to increase unless
"tripolarity" of capital flows can be built up. Developed countries
with big balance-of-payments deficits will become increasingly
reluctant to refinance loans to poor countries in repayment
difficulties. The World Bank may well find it more and more difficult
to raise money and thus to rescue poor countries needing
refinancing. With market-access also under threat, poor countries will
find it increasingly difficult to meet payments on foreign debts,
including export credits.
Non-fulfilment of contract, especially if voluntary, affects business
and public opinion emotively, infectiously and indiscriminately.
Actions by oil-producing countries affect business confidence about
many poor countries that are totally uninvolved. Neither firms nor
nations in the West are as able as before to accept a given risk of
default - let alone an increasing risk. From the viewpoint of the
multinational or the donor of aid loans, all or most poor countries
become worse risks together, because as their liquidity position
declines default in some can no longer be set against low defaults in
others.
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The popular metaphor, and increasingly the analytic base, for such
dealings is the concept of bargaining, First we must consider the
fact that a bargain (unlike a discussion, an auction or a market) is in
essence a "two-person" undertaking. If one of the "parties" to a
bargain in reality comprises many dissenting voices, then the other
party can exploit the dissent to impose worse terms. It is clear that
poor countries would gain substantially if they could reconcile their
negotiating positions and bargain "as one person" with each rich
country, or with all taken together, or (as in the case of OAPEC) by
setting them against each other. But - save with oi1, a special case
and not one of major export interest to any really poor countries
except Nigeria, Iraq and Indonesia - such action by poor countries
has proved unpractical.
The effects of divided counsels among rich countries are quite
different from the case with poor countries, because the latter
usually put themselves into the position of supplicants, while the rich
countries have to accept or reject requests. The rich countries can use
disagreements among themselves as pretexts for accepting nothing.
Disagreement among the poor countries, however, produces only
indecision about which issues to press and how to press them.'
This is one set of considerations which make bilateralism an
attractive alternative to multilateralism, especially given that it is
likely to prove impossible to unite all or most poor countries in
respect of negotiating particular practical issues with particular rich
countries. There are two further facts rendering it even more
attractive. First, the sheer complexity of negotiations - especially in
the post-oil-crisis world - requires some measure of simplification to
attain results, especially for the poor countries with few computers
(and sometimes few, or no, economists or foreign-affairs specialists
"on tap" during negotiations). Second, rich-poor relations seem in
any case to have been sorting themselves out into a series of
Bergsten, op. cit., p. 15 and passim; H. Wriggins, "Changing sources of
international bargaining capacity in selected third-world countries", discussion
outline, mimeo, 1973.
For a view of this in respect of the 1972 Santiago meeting of UNCTAD see
M. Lipton, "UNCTAD Schmunctad?", Round Table, July 1972.
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economic and political blocs: USA-Latin America, EEC-Africa,
Japan-S.E. Asia, USSR-India. Except in the last case there remain
major problems of reconciliation among the poor countries
concerned. Given these developments it makes little sense for poor
countries, especially those worst hit by rising prices of oil and cereals
to use up many scarce negotiating resources on multilateral
framework organisations which have less and less to offer. (Fias
anyone heard from the GATT's "Tokyo Round" lately?)
A most important barrier to successful bilateralism (ignoring the
preconceptions of governments in over rating multilateralism) is the
problem of non-identity between the negotiator's interest and the
interests of diverse and opposing affected parties within his own
country. This conflict has at least three important dimensions:-
to what extent can side-payments,'2 within each negotiating
country, create a situation where all parties within that country rank
outcomes similarly so that all national interests can be embodied by
each negotiator? A related question is: what practical measures of
side-payment are possible?
What is the likely distributional effect, within the rich and the
poor country, of alternative negotiating outcomes; and what is the
benefit to each negotiating partner of a particular distributional
outcome in the other partner?
In a "quasi-two-person" world where internal interests are
reconciled neither by an acceptable initial distribution nor by ex post
side-payments (e.g. by "adjustment assistance" to workers losing
from freer trade), what opportunities are opened to each negotiator
to appeal over the head of the representative of the country with
which he is negotiating to some group of citizens within that
country? All these questions are briefly considered from the
standpoint of a poor country negotiating with a rich one.
1 2 am aware that this is not the normal usage of the term. "Side payments" in
many-person games are payments by which one party is persuaded to join a
coalition. Here, the term is used to describe payments that persuade members of
a coalition, already formed, to accept outcomes of bargaining with parties
outside the coalition.
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The failure of both developed and less-developed negotiating
countries to develop side-payments, compensating the losers within
each nation out of gains from agreements raising each country's
national income, produces autarchic pressures on negotiators. This is
the most serious single barrier to effective bilateral bargaining. The
lack of concern - academic or administrative - with such side
payments remains astonishing, although such lack is probably
because under conditions of near-full-employment, the adjustments
required when trade is enlarged have proved easier than was claimed
in advance. Both the coal-miners of the Belgian Bocage and the
(largely elderly female) workforce of the British cotton-textile
industry found such adjustments surprisingly easy in the 1950s.
Adjustment assistance, mainly for retraining and resettlement, and
regional incentives to expanding industries to locate in areas damaged
by liberalisation, constitute the main methods of side-payments
within rich countries. At present, such payments are usually made
after trade has been freed, in response to firms and workers who
unsuccessfully opposed the liberalisation and now are damaged by it
(or expect, or even pretend, to be). If compensation measures were
announced at the same time as liberalisation or, better still, if the
representatives of each affected interest agreed with their national
negotiator, in advance of the negotiation, on the side-payments
required to compensate for the liberalisation, the whole climate of
rich-poor bargaining would improve. More imagination is needed
about the possible range of side-payments, employment guarantees,
tax adjustments, or even lump-sum payments may be both cheaper
to the community and more acceptable to the recipients (especially
elderly ones) than resettlement or retraining arrangements. If the
rules of the EEC or the GATT impede such steps to render
liberalisation acceptable, those rules should be changed. Since
(unusually) nobody would lose from such changes, they should be
quite easy to arrive at.
This brings us to the second question: what can be said about the
distributional effects of liberalisation. Quite strong conclusions about
the distributional impact, within each country, of liberalising
rich-poor bargains follow from weak versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin
hypotheses, especially if we do not assume that both capital and
labour are fully employed in both countries.
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For example, the following statement is a consequence of a
watered-down Heckscher-Ohlin formulation: Trade liberalisation will
normally mean that the extra goods, which the poor country sells the
rich country, have a labour/capital ratio higher than the typical
products of the rich country; and conversely, the extra goods which
the rich country sells the poor country after the liberalisation will
normally have a labour/capital ratio lower than the typical products
of the poor country. Thus a bilaterally balanced expansion of trade
will admit into the rich country imports tending to displace a larger
proportion of employed labour than of employed capital; and, into
the poor country, imports tending to displace a larger proportion of
employed capital than of employed labour.'3 Thus, on the side of
imports, rich-poor trade liberalisation (without side payments) raises
the share of labour in the national income in poor countries, but
lowers it in rich countries.
Although much empirical research is needed to establish the exact
nature of such distributional effects and their dynamic implications,
there is good reason to expect that balanced trade liberalisation will
improve distribution in poor countries as well as increasing income,
but that it may worsen distribution in rich countries while raising
income. If capital is politically stronger, relative to labour, in poor
countries than in rich ones (as is plausible), the balance of internal
forces and benefits helps to explain why so little rich-poor trade-
freeing has taken place. The class that gains relatively less from
liberalisation, and some of whose members may lose absolutely, has
relatively more political power both in poor countries (where it is the
capital-owning class) and in rich countries (where it is organised
labour).
Even if the distributional effects of a negotiating outcome do not
1 may be objected that the same requirements can be met by different
techniques, so that a "liberalised" import of (say) an electric vacuum cleaner
displaces not capital-intensive domestic production of vacuum cleaners, but
labour-intensive domestic servants. Usually, however, this happens only because
foreign exchange is too cheap, so that (for instance) imported vacuum cleaners
are underpriced; and/or because highly unequal income-distributions, helped by
interest rates kept low for the rich, further encourage such durable and
labour-replacing imports.
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create pressures substantially affecting that outcome, they may still
affect the subsequent path of relations between the negotiating
countries, including the "staying power" of the agreement reached.
If a strong group is damaged by an international agreement (even by
one beneficial to the nation of which it is part), it may well achieve
more by trying to reverse or limit or otherwise "renegotiate" that
agreement, than by trying to obtain compensation from other strong
domestic groups. Thus damage to a group should be foreseen, and
compensation arranged before or during the negotiations themselves
if nationally advantageous outcomes are to be lasting or to serve as
precedents.
An interesting problem of these "quasi-two-person" situations arises
when this compensation is not achieved. The third question now
arises: can either negotiating party gain by appealing, over the head
of the representatives of the other party - who have been impeded
by a special interest - to general interest in the other country? Is
there any reason for example why, Indian or Bangalee negotiators,
seeking improved market access to EEC for their countries' exports
of jute and cotton textiles, should not organise pressure on EEC
negotiators from EEC's own (a) housewives wanting cheaper cloth,
sheets and carpet-backings, (b) industrial consumers of such goods,
e.g. carpet-makers and clothiers (and corresponding retailers), (c)
articulators of the general interest in price stabilisation? Such
approaches would have much appeal in the period of accelerated
inflation following the oil price take-off. But they would have more
chance of success if India and Bangladesh were offering balanced
trade liberalisation and expansion safeguarding EEC's oil-hit foreign
balances; and if compensation to EEC's losers could be built into the
bargain. At present the constraints on such appeals are that they are
felt to be diplomatically somehow improper, and that ignorance
about the structure of consumer politics in rich countries prevails in
most poor-country embassies.
Given that there are ways to reduce both the conflicts within
negotiating nations, and conflicts between nations allegedly on the
same side, it is possible to create the basic condition for a two-person
deal. Most attempts to conduct rich-poor negotiations have
approached the essential task of reducing complexity in the wrong
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way. Instead of trying to cut down the numbers of participants in
effect, to bilateralise - negotiators have sought to handle issucs
separately; to negotiate trade separately from aid, and within trade
to deal with each commodity at a different conferencc.
In a situation of initial negotiating complexity morc than two
countries represented, differences of interest within each, and many
issues to tackle - negotiators not only fail to form coalitions within
and between countries, "bilateralising" the negotiation; they also
handle issues piecemeal, tending to make settlements on each issue
seem to be zero-sum even if they are not. This of course increases the
pressures of intranational interests that negotiators have failed to
reconcile in advance.
This method of handling negotiations transforms them from
partly-co-operative, two-person, game-like situations into
competitive, many-person contests. (By a "contest" I mean a
competitive game in which the parties are not necessarily prepared to
adopt minimax strategies even if only these can produce
equilibrium). This transformation enormously reduces the prospects
of successful outcomes. We may be cursed with Newtonian
economics in an Einsteinian world, but negotiating methods are
positively - or, rather, negatively - Ptolemaic!
A negotiation between two countries should consist of so selecting
issues that the deal reached may have the highest joint value to the
nations taken together. It is here suggested that if the parties play
one game on the issues as a whole, rather than a separate game on
each issue, the total outcome will more clearly be beneficial to both
nations, and the sources of side payment (e.g. the extra export
revenue to redeploy workers displaced by extra imports) will be
made explicit. The negotiators' concentration is shifted from game
management to game selection.
In advocating a bilateral approach as a desirable "post-oil" second-
best to an unattainable and complex multilateralism, I am not
suggesting that a poor country ties itself to any particular rich nation
or bloc. Rather I propose that it settle economic relations with each
country or bloc, in turn, on many issues together. The only serious
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risk of losing options lies in applying such techniques to only one
country or bloc. Indo-Soviet many-issue bilateralism works; a
similarly wide Indo-EEC approach would increase India's options. It
is a sequence of bilateral deals, simulating multilateral liberalisation,
that is proposed here.
Poor countries will generally do better by negotiating on several
issues with one country or bloc, rather than with several rich groups
on one issue. Negotiations should be seen as searches for joint gain;
not battles for "concessions". Had Britain approached entry to the
EEC in that light, the EEC would now be more "outward-looking"
and hence more prosperous, and so would Britain. Poor countries
cannot afford to negotiate as unimaginatively with rich countries as
rich countries negotiate with one another.
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